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It is common knowledge that characterizations of majority 
rule equilibria in multidimensional spaces take the form of pair-
1 wise symmetry conditions on utility gradients. Plott [1967] , the 
initial investigator of these conditions, shows that if exactly 
one utility gradient at an interior point is zero and the number 
of people is odd, then the point is an equilibrium if and only if 
the set of nonzero gradients can be partitioned into pairs of 
exactly opposing vectors. This degree of symmetry seems unlikely 
to occur. Hence it must be concluded that this type of equilibrium 
does not usually exist. 
However, the condition that all nonzero gradients must 
be paired is necessary only for equilibria at which only one 
gradient is zero. One object of this paper is to derive necessary 
conditions that do not 1! priori restrict the number of zero
gradients. These more general conditions are determined also for 
the more general case of A-majority rule, in which a coalition is 
winning only if it constitutes more than a fraction A of the voters.2 
The amount of pairwise symmetry required for equilibrium is still 
restrictive, however, unless many gradients are zero or A is near one. 
Conditions necessary for equilibrium may be less 
restrictive for equilibria contained in the boundary of a feasible 
set. Since often the feasible set is a proper subset of the space, 
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such equilibria are certainly worthy of investigation. Plott (1967] 
makes an initial step in this direction by investigating situations 
in which the feasible set is a half-space and the equilibrium is 
contained in the defining hyperplane. His conditions are genera-
lized here by allowing the equilibrium to be contained in the 
boundary of any convex feasible set, as well as by allowing more 
than one gradient to "point out" of the feasible set and by consi-
dering A-majority rule. We find that the type of pairwise 
symmetry required at boundary equilibria is of a lesser degree 
than that required at interior equilibria. But the symmetry still 
appears restrictive unless (1) the boundary is highly ·pointed at 
the equilibrium, (2) many gradients are zero or "point out" of the 
feasible set, or (3) A is near one. 
A fundamental characteristic of majority rule is that if 
two people with diametrically opposed preferences are removed from 
the set of voters, then any equilibrium remains an equilibrium. 
The votes 0£ the two i11dividuals merely "cancel each other out. "
This basic fact is what causes pairwise symmetry conditions to be 
necessary for equilibrium, as the subsequent proofs are designed 
to show. All the symmetry conditions are derived as corollaries 
to theorems stating that various sets of individuals that "disagree" 
in some sense can be deleted without upsetting equilibrium. 
This intuitive approach results in relatively concise proofs. 
Sufficient conditions involving pairwise symmetries on 
gradients are important because properties of pairs are relatively 
easy to verify. The ones derived in section 3 generalize those of 
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Plott (1967] , McKelvey and Wendell (1976] , and Slutsky (1978] by 
allowing the point to be on the boundary of a convex feasible set, 
by'allowing more than one gradient at the point to be zero or to 
"point out" of the feasible set, and by allowing for A-majority 
rule. 
1. PRELIMINARIES
The set of feasible alternatives is a convex subset V of 
a Euclidean space w: Denote by x a particular point of V, not
necessarily in the interior. Let the set of voters be denoted by 
N = {l, 2, . . . , n}. Each voter has a differentiable utility function 
defined on W. The gradient of the utility function of voter i 
3evaluated at x is denoted by ui E W. We are to investigate
pairwise symmetries in the set {u1 . .. , un} of gradients associated
with x being a voting equilibrium. 
The cone of feasible directions in which x can shift is 
F = {v E W I 3 a > O � x + av . e V}.
Observe that F is a convex cone that includes the origin. If 
x E interior(V), then F = W, whereas x E boundary (V) implies 
that F is contained in a halfspace. 
Much of the subsequent discussion concerns the dual of F, 
F* {y 8 w I v • y � 0 v v 8 F} = D.
Notice that D is a clo8ed convex cone containing the origin, and 
that D = {U} if and only if F = W. If ui E D then v • ui � 0
for all v E F, so that voter i is "happy" with x in the sense of 
not marginally benefiting by any feasible shift of x.
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Define also a cone 
E {y £ w I y ¢ D, -y £ D}.
E is a convex cone without the origin that may be empty. 
In particular, E = 0 whenever D = {O} or D is a subspace of
positive dimension. If ui £ E, then i is "unhappy" with x in the
sense that v • ui � 0 for any v £ F, and there exists v £ F such
that v • u. > O. 
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Examples of possible cones F, D, and E are illustrated 
in figure 1. In the figure and hereafter a cone generated by 
vectors y1, . • •  , Yt is defined by
Also, if M = {i1, . • •  , il} c N, the notation C (M) C (ui , • • •  , ui )1 l 
will be used for convenience. 
Define for any cone C the following derived cones: 
c+ {y £ w y • c > 0 'tJ c £ c}
c {y £ w y • c < 0 'tJ c £ c}
co = {y £ w I y • c = 0 'tJ c £ c}
let + and 0 denoteWithout fear of ambiguity, for any v £ w v , v ' v 
+ C (v)
- 0 + and v - half spaces and v
0 isC(v) , , and C (v) • Then v are 
a subspace. Observe that ui £ 
+ v implies that v • ui > o, so that
voter i benefits if x shifts in direction v. For any subsets 
Mc N and C c W, let 
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and let S (C) = SN (C) . 
+ Hence SM (v ) is the number of voters in M
who benefit by a shift in direction v. For convenience we also 
adopt the convention that if an upper case letter denotes a subset 
of voters, then the corresponding lower case letter denotes their 
number, e. g., n = jN j and Mc N implies m = j M j .
With these definitions in hand, an equilibrium concept 
can be defined. Let A be a fixed fraction 0 � A < 1. Then we
want x to be an equilibrium provided no coalition of size greater 
than An can marginally benefit by a feasible shift of x. So define 
x to be quasi-undominated (q .. !��) provided
and define x to be strictly quasi-undominated (s. q. u. d. )  provided 
v £ F => S (v+) < An.
Notice that x is q,u. d. if x is s. q. u. d. Conversely, x is s. q. u. d. 
if x is q. u. d. and An is nonintegral, which is the case when n is 
odd and A =  1/2, the majority rule case studied by Plott [1967] . 
Two alternative concepts of equilibrum for x are local 
undominance, which requires the existence of a neighborhood U of x
such that no point in U n V is unanimously preferred to x by a
coalition of size greater than An, and globa� undominance, which 
requires x to be locally undominated in every neighborhood U c W. 
When there is a finite number of voters, each with a differentiable 
utility function, global undominance implies local undominance. 
implies quasi-undorninance. The reverse implications require 
utility functions to first be locally pseudoconcave (see 
appendix B of chapter II) and then pseudoconcave (Kats and 
Nitzan [1976)). The reader is referred to the cited references 
for these results, and to Sloss [1973), McKelvey and Wendell 
[1976), and Slutsky [1978) for further discussions of the rela-
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tionship between quasi-undominance and other equilibrium concepts. 
Hence attention here can be focused solely upon quasi-undominance. 
It will be convenient for the determination of quasi-
undominance to test only directions contained in the relative 
interior of F. Lemma 2 below justifies this procedure. It also 
allows us to assume henceforth that F is a closed convex cone, so 
that D* = F** � F.4
Lemma 1: Let Mc N and v E: w. Then there exists a neighborhood
Proof: Follows from the continuity of an inner product and the 
finiteness of M. 
Lemma 2: Let Mc N and $ > O. If SM (v
+) � $ for all v contained
in the relative interior of F, then SM (v
+) � $for all v E: closure(F).
Proof: Since F is convex, every neighborhood of any v E: closure (F) 
contains points in the relative interior of F. Hence the result 
follows from lemma 1. 
Henceforth, without looo of generality, 11e assune F is closed. 
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The basic feature of majority rule we wish to exploit is 
that if the number of people who prefer alternative a1 to a2 is not
a majority, and Q c N is a set that can be partitioned into pairs 
with strictly opposite preferences on {a1, a2},  then when Q is
deleted, the number of voters preferring a1 to a2 is still not a
majority. More generally, if the number of people preferring a1
is less than An, then when Q is deleted, the number of people who 
prefer a1 is less than An -l/2q. Now, our general method will be
to show that the deletion of coalitions analogous to Q will 
leave x quasi-undominated, in some sense, in the remaining set of 
voters. But if K = N - Q, the above reasoning indicates that only 
SK (v
+) � An -l/2 (n-k) can be guaranteed by S (v+) � An. Hence we
shall say that x is q.u.d. in K c N provided
v E: F => 
where Ak is defined by
Ak =A + (A -l/2) (n/k - 1),
Similarly, x is s.q.u.d. in K provided 
v E: F => 
We now prove a simple proposition to illustrate the 
meaning of quasi-undominance in subsets of N. Say that a pair 
{i,j} E: N strongly disagree provided ui ¢ D, uj ¢ D, and
v • ui > 0 <=> v • uj < 0
for all v E: W. Observe that i and j strongly disagree if and only
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if there is a ray r c W not intersecting D such that ui E r and
uj E -r. Thus, if D contains no line, i and j strongly disagree
exactly when ui and uj are a pair of gradients exactly opposing
each other in the sense of Plott (1967] . We show that removing 
or adding pairs of strongly disagreeing voters preserves quasi-
undominance. The following lemma is useful. 
Lemma 3: Let Tc W be a subspace, and let v ET, v f O. Suppose
0 Q c N and ui ¢ T for each i E Q. If U is a neighborhood of v, 
then there exists V E U 0 T such that V • ui f 0 for all i E Q.
Proof: 
I Q U � U 0 T is an open set of T. If ui ¢ T , then
T ¢ 0 0 ui' so that dim(T 0 ui) < dim (T), Hence for each i E Q, 
T 0 0 ui is a nowhere dense subset of T. Since a countable union
of nowhere dense sets cannot contain an open set (Baire1s theorem), 
I 
U 0 T = U 
Therefore there exists v E U 0 T such that V ' ui f 0 for each i E Q.
Proposition 1: Let Q be a subset of N that can be partitioned into 
strongly disagreeing pairs, and let K = N - Q. Then x is (s.)q.u.d. 
in K iff x is (s. )q. u.d.
Proof: Suppose x is (s. )q.u. d. Let v be contained in the 
relative interior of F. Let T be the smallest subspace containing
I I 
F. Hence there is a neighborhood U of v such that U 0 T c F.
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By lemma 1 there exists a neighborhood U c U such that
SK (v
+) � SK (v
+) for any v E U. Since ui ¢ D for each i E Q, 
ui ¢ T
O for each i E Q. Hence lemma 3 implies the existence of
v E U n T c F such that v • ui f 0 for each i E Q. But Q can be 
partitioned into pairs of strongly disagreeing individuals, so that 
q/ 2, Therefore 
+ + SK (V ) :5 SK (v ) 
+ S (v ) - q/2
� An - q/2 = Akk' 
with the second inequality strict if x is s. q. u. d. By lemma 2, this 
proves x is (s. )q.u,d. in K. Now assume x is (s. )q. u. d. in K. Let 
v E F. Then SQ (v
+) :5 q/2 => S (v+) :5 SK (v
+) + q/2 � Akk + q/2 = An
(second inequality strict if x is s. q. u. d. in K). So x is (s. )q. u. d. 
Proposition 1 actually does not lead to strong pairwise 
symmetry conditions, even for the case of an interior x. In the next 
section, symmetry conditions for an interior x are obtained easily by 
a different route. But a result analogous to proposition 2 regarding 
the deletion of pairs that disagree in a weaker sense is very useful 
for the case of a boundary x. Hence define a pair {i, j} C N to
weakly disagree provided ui ¢ D, uj ¢ D, and for any v E F, 
v • ui > 0 => v • uj < 0
and v • uj > 0 => v • ui < 0 • 
Let V be the symmetric binary relation on N denoting weak dis­
agreement, so that iVj means i and j weakly disagree. If x is an 
interior point of V, then F = W and weak disagreement implies
strong disagreement. Otherwise it is possible that iVj even 
though v • ui < 0 and v • uj < 0 for some v E F. But if iVj 
and v • ui > 0 and v • u > 0, then v ¢ F; weakly disagreeingj 
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pairs can agree only on infeasible directions. The next proposition 
characterizes weakly disagreeing pairs. 
Proposition 2: If ui ¢ D and uj ¢ D, then iVj iff
C (ui, uj) n D � �. 
Proof: D and C (ui, uj) U {O} are closed convex cones. Hence if
C(ui, uj) n D = �. by a separation theorem there exists v � 0
such that v • y > 0 for all y E C (ui, uj) and v E D* = F. Hence,
since v • ui > 0 and v • uj > 0, i
Vj is false. Conversely,
Then 
ai > 0 and aj > O. Hence, because v • y :S 0 for all v E F, iVj.
Finally, basic necessary conditions are derived via the 
deletion of individuals who are malcontent in a different way. 
For any subspace T c W, say that voter i c N is content with.'.!'. 
provided ui E T
o. Let C (T) c N be the subset of N content with T.
To interpret C (T), suppose a subset of public goods is associated 
with T. Then any i e C (T) is content with the allocation of those 
particular goods at x in the sense of being indifferent to any 
proposal to change their amounts. Letting M (T) = N - C (T), each 
i e M (T) is discontented with T at x in the sense of preferring a 
change in allocation of the goods associated with T. 
Define a free subspace to be a subspace T c W for which 
Tc F. It is easy to show 
Lemma 4: 0 A subspace T is free if f D c T .
A major result of the next section is that quasi-undominance is 
preserved when M (T) is removed and T is free. Intuitively, if 
the amounts of the goods associated with T can be increased or 
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decreased freely at x, then the votes of those discontented with 
the amounts of these goods must "cancel out" for x to be in 
equilibrium. 
2. NECESSARY CONDITIONS
Theorem 1: x is (s. )q. u. d. iff x is (s. )q.u. d. in C (T) for every 
free subspace T. 
Remark 1: This theorem actually only provides a necessary condition 
for x to be (s. )q. u. d. , since T = {O} is always a free subspace and 
C ({O}) = N. Subsequently an example will be presented indicating 
that a true sufficient condition cannot be obtained by requiring T 
to be nondegenerate. 
Remark 2: The freeness of T is necessary for theorem 1. Consider 
a case with W = R2, n = 3, A =  1/2, and with D = C(O,p) with
p = (0, 1). Let u1 = u2 = p, and u3 = (1, 0). If T is taken as the
line C (p, -p), which is not free, then C (T) = {3}. But x is clearly 
not s. q. u. d. in {3}, even though x is s. q. u. d. in {1, 2, 3}. 
Lemma 5: Suppose x is q. u. d. 0 If v E F, a Ev , and v + a  E F, then
with the inequality strict if x is s. q.u. d. 
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Proof: By th� continuity of the inner product, there exists a 
+ neighborhood U of  v such that y • ui > 0 for all Y £ U, ui £ v • 
As F is convex, there exists 0 < o � 1 such that b v + oa £ F n U,
0 + Since b • ui > O for any ui £ v n a ,  and since x is q.u�d., we have
with the last inequality strict if x is s.q.u.d. 
Proof of.Theorem 1: (Figure 2 may be helpful.) Suppose x is q.u.d. 
and T 1 {O} is a free subspace, Let M = C (T). Since
i £ N - M <=> ui ¢ T
O, lemma 3 implies the existence of  v £ T such
that v 
assume 
• ui 1 0 <=> i £ N - M. Hence n = S (v
+) + S (v-) + m, We can
S (v-) :5 S (v+), switching v with -v if necessary, so that
S (v+)?: l/2 (q - m).
Let v £ F. 0 v can be expressed as v = a +  b, where a £ T , b £ T.
For any p £ D, p • a = p • (V - b)
of T implies p £To. Hence a £ D* 
p • v � O, since the freeness
F. T being free also implies
v £ F, so that v + a  £ F by the convexity of F. Applying lemma 5, 
we now have 
0 + + because our choice of  v implies S (v n a )= SM (a ), (This
inequality is strict if x is s.q.u.d,) Finally, since 
i £ M => ui £ T
O=> v • ui = a • ui, we obtain
Putting the pieces together leads to 
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with the first inequality strict i f  x is s.q.u.d. The theorem is 
proved. 
Corollary 1: Let T be a free subspace and M = C (T). If x is 
q.u.d. and v £ F, then 
+ - 0 SM (v.) - SM (v ) :5 SM (v ) + (2A - l)n,
with the inequality strict if x is s.q.u,d. 
Proof: + Theorem 1 implies SM (v ) :5 An - l/2 (n - m), so the
for m. 
Corollary 2 (Generalized Plott Theorem 1): 
Suppose x is an interior point of V and r is a ray without the origin. 
If x is q.u.d. then 
(i) l s (r) - S (-r) I :5 S (O) + (2A - l)n
(ii) S (O) � (1 - 2A)n,
with both inequalities strict if x is s.q.u.d. I f  Q is a maximal 
subset of  N that can be partitioned into disagreeing pairs, then 
n = q + S (O) whenever either one of  the following holds: 
(iii) x is q,u.d. and S (O) < 1 - (2A - l)n
(iv) x is s.q.u.d. and S (O) � 1 - (2A - l)n.
Proof: T = rO is a free subspace, since F = W.
i £ M <=> ui £ -r U {O} U r. Hence for any v £ r, 
Letting M = C (T), 
+ SM (v ) = S (r),
S (O), Applying corollary 1 first to v 
and then to -v now results in (i). Expression (i) implies (ii) 
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when r is chosen so that no gradients are contained in r or -r. 
If either (iii) or (iv) hold, then (i) implie8 ls (r) - S (-r)I = 0 
for all rays r. This implies n = q + S (O), since 
n - q - S (O) = E l s (ri) - S (-ri)I, where I indexes the linesiE! 
-ri u {O} u r that contain nonzero gradients.i 
Remark 3: Corollary 2 states the complete pairwise symmetry 
required o f  the set of  utility gradients at interior equilibria. 
2 The simple example of  figure 3, which has W = R , n = 5 and 
A = 1/2, indicates that (i) and (ii) are only necessary conditions, 
since S (v+) = 3. The example also serves to show that x being
s.q.u.d. in C (T) for every free, nondegenerate T does not imply 
that x is q.u.d., as xis s.q.u.d. in all the subsets content with 
nondegenerate subspaces: {1,2}, {1,2,3}, {1,2,4}, {1,2,5}. 
Remark H: A converse of corollary 2 is true. Specifically, if Q c N
can be partitioned into weakly disagreeing pairs and n = q + S (O), 
then x is q.u.d. if S (O) ?: (1 - 2A)n and x is s.q.u.d. if
S (O) > (1 - 2A)n. This follows easily from the observation that
+ + S (v ) = SQ (v ) � q/2 for any feasible direction v £ F. This
converse is true of any D and is generalized in section 3.
Theorem 1 is only the first step in proving symmetry 
conditions hold at boundary equilibria. However, it does imply 
necessary lower bounds on S (D) � S (E) in important cases. This is 
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not unexpected, since the vote of  an individual in D "cancels" the 
vote of  an individual in E for any feasible direction, just as the 
votes of individuals whose gradients are contained in opposing rays 
cancel. Hence one expects an analog of (i) in corollary 2 to bound 
S (D) - S (E). But an example will be presented subsequently showing 
this is not always true. First, the following corollary provides 
a sufficient condition for S (D) - S (E) to be bounded below. 
Corollar:y 
C (T) = {i 
with the 
Proo f: 
3: Suppose T is a free subspace such· that 
£ N I ui £ D U E}. I f  x is q.u.d., then
S (D) - S (E) ::: (1 - 2A)n,
inequality strict if  x is s.q,u.d. 
Let M = C (T), Let v £relative interior (F), which
exists because F is convex. Hence if  TF is the smallest subspace
containing F, there is a neighborhood U of  v such that
u n TF c F. Let Q = {i £ N I ui £ E}. For each i £ Q there exists
0 v £ F such that v • ui > O, so that ui ¢ TF. Hence lemma 3 implies
the existence o f  v £ U n TF c F such that v • ui > 0 for all i £ Q.
+ 0 There fore S (E) = SM (v ) and S (D) = SM (v-) + SM (v ), implying
S (D) - S (E) � (1 - 2A)n by corollary 1.
Remark 5: I f  DUE is a subspace, then the hypothesis of  
corollary 3 is satisfied for T = (Du E)o. One case is D
E = �. for which the result is merely (ii) of corollary 2.
{O}, 
Another case is D + C (O,p), E = C (-p), which occurs when V is 
uniquely supported by a hyperplane at x . I f  D U E is not a
subspace, the hypothesis may not be satisfied, and the bound 
on S (D) - S (E) can be violated if dim (W) > 2. An example with 
dim (W) = 3, n = 9, and A = 1/2 is shown in figure 4. There, 
none o f  {u1, • • •  ,u6} are in Eu D, {u7,u8} CE, and u9 £ D·
x is s.q.u,d., since directions v in the corners of  F get 
S (v+) = 4 < 9/2 votes and directions in the middle o f  F get
only 2 votes. But S (D) - S (E) = -1 � O.
Pairwise symmetries at boundary equilibria will be 
implied by the following theoren1. It re fers to situations in 
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which x is (s.)q.u.d. in a coalition whose members' gradients are 
contained in a two dimensional aubspace. This occurs when x is 
(s.)q.u.d, and a subspace T of  dimension dim (W) - 2 E: 0 is free,
for then the gradients of members of  C (T) are in the two dimen-
0 sional subspace T and x is (s,)q.u.d. in C (T) by theorem 1.
Hence, for example, theorem 2 \</ill be shown to imply necessary
pairwise symmetries when x �s contained in the boundary o f  V and 
V is uniquely supported at x by a hyperplane, since in this case
many subspaces o f  dimension dim (W) - 2 are free. 
Theorem 2: Let T be a two dimensional subspace and 
M = {i £ N I ui £ T}. Let Q be a max imal subset of M that can be
partitioned into weakly disagreeing pairs, and let K = M - Q. Then
x is (s.)q.u .d. in K if x is (s.)q.u.d. in M .  
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Remark 6: This theorem differs from the analogous proposition 1 
concerning strongly disagreeing pairs by referring to only a two-
dimensional subspace and by requiring Q to be maximal. Neither 
additional hypothesis can be eliminated. Figure S (a) depicts a 
2 situation with n = S, A = 1/2, W = R , D 
By proposition 2, 2VS, 3VS, and 2V4. I f  Q 
C (O, p), and x s.q.u.d. 
{3,S} U {2,4} is
deleted, x is s.q.u.d. in {l}, but Q {2,S} cannot be deleted 
because x is not s.q.u.d. in {1,3,4}. This shows Q must be taken 
max imal. In figure S (b), n = 7, A= 1/2, W = R3, and D = C (O,p).
All gradients except u4 and us are in the plane of the figure, with
us receding behind and u4 coming up off  the page. The gradients
0 u3, u4 and us are all·slightly lower than the plane p seen in
cross-section as H. Hence C = 
-p. The only disagreeing pair 
+ + + u3 n u4 II us is a narrow cone containing
is {6,7}. I f  {6,7} is deleted, then 
+ s { } (-p )1, .. . ,s 3 and x is not q.u.d. in {l, • . •  ,S}, But, as 
u! 11 C = u; II C � �. x is a.q.u.d. in {1, • • •  7}. Hence, figure S (b)
shows T must be assumed two dimensional in theorem 2, 
Lemma 6: Let T, M, Q and K be defined as in theorem 2. Suppose
I 
T II D � {O} and T II D contains no line. Then there exists Q C Q
such that q = q/2 and C(K u Q) n D = �. where K = {i £ K I ui ¢ D}.
Proof: Let r £ T II D be a nondegenerate ray containing the origin.
For any nonzero v £ T let a (v) be the angle measured counterclockwise
from r to v, ·.�Lth the convention 0 :S CT (v) < 21T. Number the members
of Q as 1,2, ... ,q so that i < j implies a (ui) $ a (uJ), as in figure 6.
Because Q can be partitioned into weakly disagreeing pairs, a tedious 
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but straightforward argument that we omit establishes that iV (i + q/2) 
for each 1 � i S q/2. Let o (•) be defined by O (i) = i + q/2, so that
iVo (i) for i � i � q/2.
Let AC Q u K. Because T n n  contains no line and ui ¢ D
for any i £ Q u K, it can be shown that dim (T) = 2 implies
C (A) n D = ¢ <=> C (A) n r = ¢. Thus we need only establish the
existence of  Q c Q such that q = q/2 and C (K u Q) n r = ¢.
Now consider C (K). Let a £  K satisfy a (u
a
) � a (ui) for
A 
all i £ K and let b £ K satisfy a (ub) � a (ui) for all i £ K. Then
c(K) n r f ¢ <=> a (ub) - a (ua) 2: n <=> C (ua,ub) n r f ¢. But then
C (K) n r  f ¢ implies aVb, contrary to the maximality of  Q. Hence
C (K) n y = ¢ and C (K) = C (ua,ub).
Suppose C (Ku{l}) n r = ¢. Then, since a (ub) - a (u1) < n, 
a (uq/2) - a (u1) < n, and a (ub) - a (ua) < n, we have
max{a(ub), a (uq/2)} - min{a (ua), a ( u1)} < n. 
Therefore C (K u {1, ..• 'q/2}) n r = ¢, and the lenuna is proved.
Similarly, the lenuna is proved if C (K u {q}) n r = ¢. Furthermore,
letting Qi= {i, i+l, • . •  ,o (i-1)}, the lenuna is proved if
C (K u Qi) n r = ¢ for any 1 < i 5 q/2. Hence it remains to consider
the case where C(K U {l}), C (K U {q}), and C (K U Qi) for 1 < i 5 q/2
all intersect r. 
Now, C(K u {l}) n r f ¢ implies lVb and C (K u {q}) n r = ¢
implies aVq. For 1 < i � q/2, C (K u Q.) n r f ¢ implies iVb orl 
aV (o (i-1)) or iV (o (i-1)). Let i0 be the maximal 1 � i � q/2 such that
iVb. Let jO be the minimal i0 < j � q/2 + 1 such that aV (o (j-1)).
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Then substitution of  
{10
,b} u {i0+1, o (i0)} 
u . ..  u {j0-1, o (j0-2)} u {a, o (j0-1)}
for {i
0
, o (i0)} 
u {i0+1, o (i0+1)} u • • .  u {j0-1, o (j0-1)}
in the partition Q = {l, 0 (1)} u ... u {q/2, o (q/2)} yields a
partition of  Q u {a,b} into weakly disagreeing pairs. This
contradiction of  Q maximal finishes the proo f. 
Proof of  Theorem 2: Case 1: T n D = {O}. In this case each weakly
disagreeing pair in Q is strongly disagreeing and the theorem follows 
by proposition 1. Case 2: T n D = T. Then Q = ¢ and the theorem is
trivial. Case 3: T n D f T contains a line l. Because dim (T) = 2,
there exists nonzero v £ T such that l = v0• Since D is convex,
T n D = v0 or T n D = v0 u v+ (switching v and -v i f  necessary).
0 + I f  T n D = v u v and ui,uj ¢ D for some i,j £ M, then
C (ui,uj) n D = ¢. Hence Q = ¢ and the theorem is trivial if
0 + 0 T n D = v U v . I f  T n D = v , then for any i,j £ M,
iVj <=> C (ui,uj) n v
0 f ¢. Hence all of {ui I i £ K} and half o f
{ui i £ Q}  are contained.in one halfspace (v
+ or v-). Therefore
there exists Q C Q such that q = q/2 and C (K u Q) n D = ¢.
By lemma 6, such a Q also exists for the remaining Case 4:
T n D f ¢ and T n D contains no line, Therefore we must prove the
theorem for cases 3 and 4 assuming such a Q exists. But then
C (K u Q) is a closed, convex and pointed cone not intersecting the
convex closed cone D, so a separation theorem implies the existence 
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o f v £ D*
A A + F such that C(Ku Q) C v ,  Hence, since x is q.u.d. in M, 
� + Q �A m An - l/2(n-q-k).m 
This implies, as Q q/2, that k � An - l/2(n-k) = Akk, with the
inequality strict i f  x is s.q.u.d. in M. Since SK(v
+) � k for all
v £ F, x is (s.)q.u.d. in K. 
Corollary 4 (Generalized Plott Theorem 2): Suppose D = C(O,p1,p2),
with p1 and p2 nonzero but not necessarily distinct. Let T be a
two dimensional subspace containing D, M = {i £ N I ui £ T}, Q a
maximal subset of  M that can be partitioned into weakly disagreeing
pairs, and K = {i £ M - Q I ui ¢ D}. Then if  x is q.u.d.,
A 
(i) k � S(D) + (2A - l)n
(ii) m - S(D) - S(E) � q � m - 2S(D) - (2A - l)n,
with the inequality in (i) and the second inequality in (ii) strict 
if  x is s,q, u.d, Furthermore, i f  Q is the maximal subset of N that 
can be partitioned into weakly disagreeing pairs, and p1 = ± p2, then
n = q + S(D) + S(E) if
(iii) x is q.u.d. and S(D) - S(E) < 1 - (2A-l)n 
or 
(iv) x is s.q. u.d. and S(D) - S(E) � 1 - (2A-l)n. 
Proof: 0 0 Since 'f contains D, M = C (T ) and T is a free subspace.
By theorem 1, x is (s.)q.u.d. in M. Hence by theorem 2, x is
(s.)q,u.d. in M - Q. Also, for D = C(O,p1,p2), cases 3 or 4 of
A 
the Proo f of  theorem 2 apply, so that k �An - l/2(n - k), where 
k = k + S(D), Hence (i) follows, The second inequality in (ii)
follows from (i) by substituting m - q - S(D) for kin (i). 
The first inequality in (ii) holds because E U D c T and no 
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i £ M with ui £EU D can weakly disagree with anybody. By (ii),
q = m - S(D) - S(E) i f  either (iii) or (iv) hold. I f  also 
P1 = ± P2, then all n gradients are contained in the union of  a
finite number o f  two dimensional subspaces that each contain D. 
Summing over these subspaces consequently yields n = q + S(D) + S(E)
i f (iii) or (iv) holds and p1 = ± p2.
Remark 7: Observe the analogy between corollaries 2 and 4. 
Expression (i) in corollary 2 puts a bound on the minimal set o f  
people whose gradients are in a one dimensional subspace 
containing D � {O} that does not contain a disagreeing pair. 
Expression (i) in corollary 4 puts a bound on the minimal set of  
people, whose gradients are in a two dimensional subspace containing 
a D � {o}, that does not contain a weakly disagreeing pair,
Expressions (iii) and (iv) in the two corollaries are obviously 
similar, 
Remark 8: Corollary 4(ii) indicates the pairwise symmetry that roust 
hold at boundary equilibria i f  D is at most two dimensional, since 
then iVj iff ui and uj occupy symmetrical positions about D. D is
at most two dimensional if V is uniquely supported at x by a hyper-
plane, or if F can be defined as the intersection of only two half-
spaces with boundaries containing x. The pairwise symmetry of  all 
gradients is implied by (iii) or (iv) only if  V is uniquely supported 
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at x by a hyperplane. Clearly, less symmetry is required if  V is so 
"pointed" at x that D is more than two dimensional; it seems that 
corollaries 2 and 4 indicate the only situations in which required 
symmetries involve pairs of  gradients. 
Remark 9: Notice that because D is two dimensional, (ii) o f  
corollary 4 implies the validity of S (D) - S (E) � (l-2A)n without
requiring the condition that D u E be contained in a subspace
containing only gradients in Du E, which was needed in corollary 3. 
Remark 10; A converse of corollary 4 is also true: I f  Q C  N can be
partitioned into weakly disagreeing pairs and n = q + S (D) + S (E),
then x is q.u.d. if S (D) - S (E) � (1 - 2A)n and x is s.q.u.d. if
S (D) - S (E) > (1 - 2 A)n. This follows easily from the observation
that S (v+) � 8=- (v+) + S (E) � q/2 + S (E) for any feasible v E F. Q 
This converse is true for any D and is generalized in ocction 3. 
3. SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS 
Most conditions suf ficient for quasi-undomination are not 
as general as the necessary ones and, unfortunately, require more 
notation for their derivation. However, there is one general result 
providing a necessary as well as a sufficient condition, although it 
is not o ften useful i f  F is "large". 
Theorem 3: Let {T } be a collection o f  subspaces such that a 
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FCU T . Then x is (s.)q.u.d. if  and only if  for every subspace Taa a 
that intersects F, x is (s.)q.u.d. when every person's gradient is 
projected onto Ta . 
Proo f: = ai + i i 0 Given a subspace T, write ui 0 a1, where a0 
E T ,
a� ET. The set {a�} is the set of gradients projected onto T, and
the result follows from the fact that v • u1 > 0 if  and only i f
i v • a1 > 0 when v E F n T.
The usefulness of the criterion provided by theorem 3 is 
severely limited by the tradeof f  between checking many subspaces of 
low dimension and checking fewer subspaces of  higher dimension. To 
obtain more tractable conditions, we introduce new notation, Let 
M = {i E N ui E E U D}. For any M C M C N and for any v E F, define
� (v) 
and 
+ - 0 SM-M (v ) - SM-M (v u v )
Now we have what will prove to be a very useful result. 
Theorem 4: Let Hi_, • • •  ,� be a collection G f  subsets o f  N satiBfying
N = M1 U . .. u M.h and Mi n Mj = M for i Y, j :
h 
E nM � S (D) - S (E) + (2A-l)n,i=l i 
Then x is q.u.d, if
and x is  s.q.u.d, if  the inequality is strict. 
Proof: Let v 











S (E) + E 
i=l 
h 
S (E) + E 
i=l 
h 
S (D) + E 
i=l 
- 0 S (v u v ) 






E SM -Mi=l i 
- 0 (v u v )
+ (2A -l)n. 
follows by substituting n - S (v+) 
vo)(v - u 
+ (2A.-l)n 
- 0 for S (v u v ) • 
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The proof that x is s.q. u.d. if strict inequality holds is identical. 
Corollary 5: Suppose x E: lnterior(V), Let Q be a maximal subset of N 
that can be partitione<l into disagreeing pairs. Then x is q. u.d. if 
n - q S 2S (O) + (2A.-l)n, and x is s.q.u. d. if n - q < 2S (O) + (2A.-l)n.
Remark 11: Observe that 
n - q - S (O) = E 
it:I 
where I indexes the lines .ti "' -ri u {O} u ri that contain nonzero
gradients. Hence the sufficient condition for x to be q.u.d. is that 
E I S (ri) - S (-r1) I ::; S (O) + (2;\.-l)n.iE:l 
Notice the relationship to (i) in corollary 2. 
Proof of Corollary 5: In theorem 4, take Mi= {it:N l uid'.i) for each
i E: I. Since D = {O}, these Mi satisfy the hypothesis of theorem 4.
Also, nM = I S (ri) - S (-ri) I •  i 
n - q $ 2S (O) + (2A.-l)n implies
Hence, by remark 11, 
E � � S (O) + (2A.-l)n = 
iE:I i 
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S (D) - S (E) + (2;\.-l)n. Therefore the result follows from theorem 4. 
Remark 12: The condition of corollary 5 is not necessary for x to be 
q. u. d. , as figure 7 illustrates. There, n = 9, A =  1/2, D = {O}, 
x is s.q.u. d. since max S (v+) = 4, but
= 3 f. 2 S (O). 
Remark 13: The simple sufficient condition mentioned in remark 4 
is a special case of corollary 5. 
Corollary 6: Suppose x E: boundary(V) with D = C (O, p) (p � 0). 
Let Q be a maximal subset of N that can be partitioned into weakly 
disagreeing pairs. Then x is q. u. d. if n - q S 2S (D) + (2A-l)n,
and x is s. q. u.d. if n - q < 2S (D) + (2A.-l)n.
Remark 14: Notice the relationship of this inequality to the second 
inequality in (ii) of corollary 4. 
Proof of corollary 6: Let T1, . . .  ,Th be a set of two dimensional
subspaces that collectively contain all nonzero gradients and that 
satisfy DC Ti. Let Mi= {i E: N I ui E: Ti}' and notice M1, . .. �b 
satisfy the hypothesis of theorem 4. Let Qi be a maximal subset of 
Mi that can be partitioned into weakly disagreeing pairs. Then
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h 
" K" { · '! Q I ¢ D} Then as in cases 3 and 4q = ,, q1. • Let = J £ ,. . - i u . • i=l i 1 J 
of the proof of theorem 2, there exists vi £ F satisfying
and 
This v yields the greatest nM (v
+), so that�
k
i - S(E)i.i i i 
h 
Noticing that n - q = E (ki - S(E)) + S(D) + S(E), we havei=l 
h 
E n.. - n - q - S(D) - S(E) 
i=l 11i 
::; S(D) - S(E) + (2A-l)n. 
Hence theorem 4 implies corollary 6. 
We conclude with a useful theorem that can be easily applied 
if D {O} or D = C(O,p). 
Theorem 5 (Partial converse to theorem 1): 
Let T1, ... ,Th be any collection of free subspaces such th�t
C(T1) u ... u C(Th) = N and C(Ti) n C(Tj) = M for i f j.
q.u. d. if 
Then x is 
(i) S(D) - S(E) < l-(2A-l)n and x is q.u,d, in each C(Ti)'
and x is s.q. u. d. if 
(ii) S(D) - S(E) ::; l-(2A-l)n and x is s. q. u.d, in each CCT1).
Lemma 7: For any MC N that contains M, x is q.u.d. in M iff 
nM :S S(D) - S(E) + (2A-l)n,
and x is s.q.u.d. in M iff the inequality is strict. 
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Proof: By lemma 2, there exists v £ relative interior (F) such that 
- + > + SM(v ) - SM(v ) for all v £ F. By suitable applications of lemmas 1 
and 3, v £ relative interior (F) can be shown to imply that
V • ui > 0 for each ui £ E. Hence, aince M c M and v • ui � 0 for
all ui £ D,
Similarly, there exists v £ relative interior (F) such that
"+ > + SM-M(v ) - SM-M(v ) for any v £ F and 
,...+ "+ SM(v ) = SM-M(v ) + S(E),
Hence SM-M(v
+) = SM(V
+) - S(E) � SM(�
+) - S(E) 
SM-M(v
+) is maximized on F at v. 
Therefore, if x is q.u. d. in M then 







= max {s -(v+) - [m - S -(v
+) - S(D) - S(E)] }
M-M M-M v£F 
+ S(D) + S(E) - m· + 2 max SM�M(v ),v£F 
::; S(D) - S(E) - m + 2Am�
S(D) - S(E) + (2A-l)n, 
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with the inequality strict if x is s. q. u. d. in M. The other direction 
of proof is straightforward and very similar to the proof used in 
theorem 4. 
Proof of Theorem 5: Let Mi = C (Ti) and observe that M1, . . .  ,� satisfy
the hypothesis of theorem 4. Suppose (i) holds. Then by lemma 7, 
nM S S (D) - S (E) + (2A-l)n < 1.i 
Hence, as each � is nonpositive,
i 
Therefore x is q. u. d. by theorem 4. 
n < S (D) - S (E) + (2A-l)n $ 1.Mi
h 
h 
E n S � S S (D) - S (E) + (2A-l)n.
i=l Mi 'n 
If (ii) holds, then by lemma 7, 
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{v l v•u =v•u =O} 5 6 
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FIGURE 4 
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{vEF l v•ui>O for i=S,6,7,8}
FIGURE 5 
(a) 







1. Although to my knowledge symmetry conditions for pairs of 
utility gradients have only been studied previously in three 




For interior equilibria, Slutsky [1978] has independently
derived pairwise symmetry conditions for A-majority rule
equilibria, His conditions are similar to some of those
derived here.
A simple generalization would be to allow W to be a 
differentiable manifold, F a convex cone in the tangent space 
TW of  W at x, and ui an element of  the dual of TW • x x 
4. For this and other results mentioned below concerning convex
cones, refer to any standard source such as Fenchel [1953]
or Rockafellar [1970].
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